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- root@arter97-dgist:~/caf/platform/system/security# git log --no-merges @^..@|cat
- commit 0a62361d9ffd460afcaa32d8550f357e9c1e0812
- Author: Janis Danisevskis <jdanis@google.com>
- Date: Fri Oct 4 11:01:54 2019 -0700
- Fix memory leak in keystore
- The operation device map needs to be cleand up on finish regardless of
- whether the operations succeeds of fails. The operation lifecycle ends
- in any case.
- Bug: 141317862
- Test: Generate key and perform repeated operations.
- Watch memory consumptoin not raise with using:
- adb shell dumpsys meminfo keystore
- Merged-In: I3a25aa67f121832640848a38398c523e20a2c6df
- Change-Id: I3a25aa67f121832640848a38398c523e20a2c6df
- commit 85735d8693cfee84989112263131f0d1cf0d3be4
- Author: Janis Danisevskis <jdanis@google.com>
- Date: Wed Aug 14 13:42:19 2019 -0700
- Fix memory leak in keystore
- When operations are aborted by an app or an app dies, tokens are not
- removed from the device token map. This patch moves the this map from
- key_store_service to KeyStore so that it can be accessed by the
- keymaster workers. It also adds calls to removeOperationDevice to the
- binderDied hook of the keymaster workers as well as to keystore service
- abort.
- Add a call to removeOperationDevice() inside pruneOperation() function on
- keystore/keymaster_worker.cpp
- Bug: 139383076
- Bug: 141317862
- Test: atest keystore_unit_tests (passed)
- Merged-In: I90d4dc9d4510f4ac250022c89240a742b9e8d4b4
- Change-Id: I90d4dc9d4510f4ac250022c89240a742b9e8d4b4
- commit 3c04bca28a68b9a0148b9ec7fcd4f53d27b151a5
- Author: Shawn Willden <swillden@google.com>
- Date: Tue Oct 1 17:43:43 2019 -0600
- Fix handling of user password changes.
- A bug introduced in a patch intended to upgrade keystore master keys
- to use AES-256 and SHA-256 instead of AES-128 and SHA1 causes the
- newly-updated master key to fail to be retrievable ever again. Making
- this worse, after five successive failures, keystore decided that all
- the data is bad and wipes the user's keystore. This problem happens
- on every password change if the master key is 128 bits. Luckily,
- since the introduction of synthetic passwords to support escrow
- tokens, the password presented to keystore is the synthetic password,
- which never changes. So this problem only crops up in devices that
- did not have synthetic passwords (launched with Android N or earlier),
- were not upgraded to O DR1 (when synthetic passwords were enabled by
- default), were never factory reset or had their password removed and
- re-added during all of that time and were then upgraded to P or Q,
- when the master key upgrade code was present.
- This CL fixes the upgrade process so that updated master keys can be
- used. It doesn't change the key size, the keys stay 128 bits, but now
- they're readable and usable. Factory resetting allows an entirely
- new master key to be generated, which will be AES-256.
- Note that the keystore master key is not really essential to the
- security of Keystore keys. They're also encrypted by the secure
- world (TEE or SE), which is their primary protection. The master key
- just provides a cryptographic dependency on the user's password, so
- that in the event of a secure world break the attacker still has to
- brute force the user's password to recover the key material, or use of
- the protected keys.
- Bug: 129970023
- Test: Manual
- Change-Id: I8ce2bb2359cf822039c137bb6bb1fc225da47c29
- commit 58e675567c446b77c6ec83d8e07fecbd829f60ae
- Author: Shawn Willden <swillden@google.com>
- Date: Wed Oct 2 08:58:22 2019 -0600
- Encrypt AES-256 keystore master keys.
- ag/5984229 that added support for AES-256 master keys inadvertently
- caused them not to be encyrpted by the user's password. This is less
- damaging to security than it might appear because these keys are also
- encrypted by Keymaster, in the TEE or StrongBox.
- Bug: 141955555
- Test: Manually verify password is encryption on a userdebug build.
- Change-Id: Ic5e82546df67346e4c348273cf4fe2bac382c9dc
- Merged-In: Ie44a4097e058bd5b9e45aa73115c266b9570a4fc
- commit 921d3a3678408af3598ef6bd8ec8f8afd4f6ee2e
- Author: Shawn Willden <swillden@google.com>
- Date: Wed Oct 2 08:58:22 2019 -0600
- Encrypt AES-256 keystore master keys.
- ag/5984229 that added support for AES-256 master keys inadvertently
- caused them not to be encyrpted by the user's password. This is less
- damaging to security than it might appear because these keys are also
- encrypted by Keymaster, in the TEE or StrongBox.
- Bug: 141955555
- Test: Manually verify password is encryption on a userdebug build.
- Change-Id: Ic5e82546df67346e4c348273cf4fe2bac382c9dc
- commit b951bc53174bc583e7b76c40982aa82da8b01854
- Author: Shawn Willden <swillden@google.com>
- Date: Wed Oct 2 08:58:22 2019 -0600
- Encrypt AES-256 keystore master keys.
- ag/5984229 that added support for AES-256 master keys inadvertently
- caused them not to be encyrpted by the user's password. This is less
- damaging to security than it might appear because these keys are also
- encrypted by Keymaster, in the TEE or StrongBox.
- Bug: 141955555
- Test: Manually verify password is encryption on a userdebug build.
- Change-Id: Ic5e82546df67346e4c348273cf4fe2bac382c9dc
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